Biased Ministers, Inefficiency, and Control in Distributive Policies
Biased Ministers, Inefficiency, and Control in Distributive Policies
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部长偏见、低效率和分配政策的控制
DOI：
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Anne J. Rahming
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Franchino;Anne J. Rahming
文献断言，立法者不太可能一致通过低效率的政策。然而，在共同渔业政策（CFP）的支持下，系统和一致地增加总允许渔获量的数量，按照国际公认的标准是无效的。本文开发了一个分配政治游戏来解释这个难题。这场游戏基于这样一种假设，即专门的理事会组织是由偏好离群者组成的，其行为就像“跑道机构”。这篇文章显示，在16年的时间里，部长们对环境保护的关注程度明显降低，对（农业）渔业问题的支持程度更高，而且比他们的政府更右翼。这篇文章还测试了欧洲委员会的环保主义偏好。最后，我们将这些偏好映射到CFP的政策输出中，并展示了理事会如何通过限制国家当局和授权给委员会来处理由其自己的决定和国家执行所造成的问题。
The literature asserts that legislators are unlikely to adopt inefficient policies unanimously. Yet the systematic and unanimous increase in quantities of Total Allowable Catch, under the auspices of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), is inefficient by internationally recognized standards. This article develops a game of distributive politics to explain this puzzle. The game is based on the assumption that specialized Council formations are composed of preference outliers and behave like `runway institutions'. The article shows how, over a period of 16 years, ministers were significantly less concerned with environmental protection, were more supportive of (agri-)fishery issues, and were more right-wing than their governments. The article also tests the conservationist preferences of the European Commission. Finally, we map these preferences into the policy output of the CFP and show how the Council deals with problems created by its own decisions and by national implementation through the restraining of national authorities and delegation to the Commission.