Procurement competition in the presence of IoT-enabled B2B E-commerce
Procurement competition in the presence of IoT-enabled B2B E-commerce
复制标题
物联网 B2B 电子商务下的采购竞争
DOI：
10.1016/j.elerap.2021.101091
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发表时间：
2021-10-05
影响因子：
6
通讯作者：
Liu, Mengqi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ma, Shanshan;Li, Guo;Liu, Mengqi
物联网（IoT）加速了电子商务的发展，并使企业对企业（B2B）现货市场得以出现。本研究考虑由一个供应商和两个制造商组成的供应链。两个制造商可以从两个来源采购原材料，即从具有远期合同的供应商或从B2B现货市场。两个制造商使用原材料生产最终产品，并在最终客户市场参与古诺竞争。基于两个制造商的采购策略，两个制造商之间存在三种竞争结构：（NN）两个制造商都只从B2B现货市场采购原材料;（FN）一个制造商从远期合同和B2B现货市场双重来源采购原材料，而另一个制造商只从B2B现货市场采购原材料;以及（FF）两个制造商从双重来源采购原材料。我们调查哪种采购策略对制造商更好。研究发现，当且仅当现货价格的不确定性超过一个阈值时，制造商的最优设置是从两个来源采购原材料。此外，FN子博弈中的最优批发价格小于FF子博弈中的价格。FF子博弈的最优订货量小于FN子博弈的最优订货量。如果供应商的风险规避超过一个阈值，整个下游制造商可以从FN战略中受益。同时，FF子博弈总是有利于整个供应链。
The Internet of things (IoT) has accelerated the development of e-commerce and enabled business-to-business (B2B) spot markets to emerge. This study considers a supply chain composed of one supplier and two manufacturers. Two manufacturers can procure raw materials from dual sources, that is, from a supplier with a forward contract or from a B2B spot market. Two manufacturers use raw materials to produce the final product and take part in Cournot competition in the final customer market. On the basis of the procurement strategies of two manufacturers, three competition structures exist between the manufacturers: (NN) both manufacturers procure raw materials only from a B2B spot market; (FN) one manufacturer procures raw materials from dual sources, namely, a forward contract and a B2B spot market, while the other manufacturer only obtains them from a B2B spot market; and (FF) both manufacturers procure raw materials from dual sources. We investigate which procurement strategy is better for manufacturers. Our study finds that the optimal setting is for manufacturers to procure raw materials from dual sources if and only if the spot price uncertainty exceeds a threshold value. Furthermore, the optimal wholesale price in the FN subgame is less than the price in the FF subgame. The optimal order quantity in the FF subgame is less than the quantity in the FN subgame. Whole downstream manufacturers can benefit from the FN strategy if the supplier's risk aversion exceeds a threshold value. Meanwhile, the FF subgame always benefits the whole supply chain.