Compact and Malicious Private Set Intersection for Small Sets
Compact and Malicious Private Set Intersection for Small Sets
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DOI：
10.1145/3460120.3484778
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发表时间：
2021-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Mike Rosulek;Ni Trieu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mike Rosulek;Ni Trieu
提出了一种基于Diffie-Hellman密钥协议的两方私集交集（PSI）协议。在理想排列+随机oracle模型下，该协议被证明是安全的。对于小集合（500项或更少），我们的协议需要最少的时间和通信的任何已知的PSI协议，即使是那些只有半诚实的安全和不基于Diffie-Hellman的协议。它是对Huberman， Franklin和Hogg (ACM电子商务1999)20年历史的经典Diffie-Hellman PSI协议的少数重大改进之一。我们的协议实际上是一个从一类密钥协议协议构造PSI的通用转换。这种转变的灵感来自Cho、Dachman-Soled和Jarecki （CT-RSA 2016）的一种技术，我们在几个重要的方面对其进行了简化和优化，以实现卓越的效率。
We describe a protocol for two-party private set intersection (PSI) based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement. The protocol is proven secure against malicious parties, in the ideal permutation + random oracle model. For small sets (500 items or fewer), our protocol requires the least time and communication of any known PSI protocol, even ones that are only semi-honest secure and ones that are not based on Diffie-Hellman. It is one of the few significant improvements to the 20-year old classical Diffie-Hellman PSI protocol of Huberman, Franklin, and Hogg (ACM Elec. Commerce 1999). Our protocol is actually a generic transformation that constructs PSI from a class of key agreement protocols. This transformation is inspired by a technique of Cho, Dachman-Soled, and Jarecki (CT-RSA 2016), which we streamline and optimize in several important ways to achieve our superior efficiency.