Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols
Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.702042
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发表时间：
2005-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jae-Seung Baek;Jun-Koo Kang;I. Lee
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jae-Seung Baek;Jun-Koo Kang;I. Lee
使用韩国公司从1989年到2000年的股票挂钩私人证券发行的全面样本，我们研究这种发行是否可以被用作发行人和收购方之间的财富转移机制。对于同一企业集团（财阀）的发行人和收购人的交易，如果价格折扣较大，则过去业绩良好的财阀关联发行人的公告回报率低于其他类型的发行人。相比之下，与其他类型的收购者相比，这宗交易为财阀关联的收购者创造了更多的价值。此外，如果与财阀有关联的收购方从同一财阀中表现不佳的发行方购买证券，表现良好的财阀收购方的财富损失要大于其他类型的收购方。我们还发现，具有良好的过去业绩的财阀企业倾向于以较低的价格出售私人证券给他们的成员公司。这一证据与企业集团内部的隧道行为是一致的。
Using a comprehensive sample of equity-linked private securities offerings by Korean firms from 1989 to 2000, we examine whether such offerings can be used as a mechanism for wealth transfer between issuers and acquirers. For deals involving issuers and acquirers in the same business group (chaebol), the announcement returns for chaebol-affiliated issuers with good past performance are lower than those for other types of issuers if the price discount is larger. In contrast, this deal leads to more value creation for chaebol-affiliated acquirers than other types of acquirers. Furthermore, well-performing chaebol-affiliated acquirers experience a larger wealth loss than other types of acquirers if they buy securities from poorly performing issuers in the same chaebol. We also find that chaebol firms with good past performance tend to sell private securities at a low price to their member firms. This evidence is consistent with tunneling within business groups.