Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution
Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution
复制标题
宽大处理计划和卡特尔起诉
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.165688
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发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Massimo Motta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Michele Polo;Massimo Motta
我们研究了在宽大程序下针对串通的竞争政策的执行，该计划减少了对向反垄断机构披露信息的公司的罚款。这样的计划给公司提供了打破串通的动机，但也可能产生有利于串通的效果，因为它们降低了不当行为的预期成本。我们分析了在替代规则下的最优策略，获得了不同方案的排名，并展示了何时使用减少罚款可以改善反垄断执法。
We study the enforcement of competition policy against collusion under Leniency Programs, which give reduced fines to firms revealing information to the Antitrust Authority. Such programs give firms an incentive to break collusion, but may also have a pro-collusive effect, since they decrease the expected cost of misbehaviour. We analyze the optimal policy under alternative rules, obtaining a ranking of the different schemes and showing when the use of reduced fines may improve antitrust enforcement.