Potential, value, and consistency
Potential, value, and consistency
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DOI：
10.2307/1911054
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发表时间：
1989-05
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
S. Hart;A. Mas-Colell
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Hart;A. Mas-Colell
令P为定义在具有可转移效用的合作博弈空间上的实值函数，满足以下条件：在每个博弈中，所有参与者的边际贡献（根据P）都是有效的（即，加起来等于大联盟的价值）。事实证明，这样的函数 P 只存在一个——称为势能——而且所得的支付向量与 Shapley 值一致。潜在的方法产生了该值的其他特征；特别是在新的内部一致性属性方面。进一步的结果涉及加权值和不可转让的实用案例。计量经济学会版权所有 1989。
Let P be a real-valued function defined on the space of cooperative games with transferable utility, satisfying the following condition: In every game, the marginal contributions of all players (according to P) are efficient (i.e., add up to the worth of the grand coalition). It is proved that there exists just one such function P--called the potential--and moreover that the resulting payoff vector coincides with the Shapley value. The potential approach yields other characterizations for the value; in particular, in terms of a new internal consistency property. Further results deal with weighted values and with the nontransferable utility case. Copyright 1989 by The Econometric Society.