Asymmetric Consumer Learning and Inventory Competition
Asymmetric Consumer Learning and Inventory Competition
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.1060.0615
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发表时间：
2007-02
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
V. Gaur;Young-Hoon Park
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
V. Gaur;Young-Hoon Park
我们开发了一个消费者学习和选择行为的模型，以应对市场上的不确定服务。学习可能是不对称的，也就是说，消费者可能会将不同的权重与积极和消极的体验联系起来。在此消费者模型下，我们刻画了零售商的稳态需求分布，每个零售商持有一个恒定的库存服务水平。然后，我们考虑一个非合作博弈的两个零售商之间的竞争的基础上，他们的服务水平在稳态。在这个游戏中的零售商的需求分布建模使用乘法总的市场份额模型，其中的平均需求是从个人购买的稳态结果，但该模型在其他方面进行了简化，以便于处理。我们的模型产生了一个独特的纯策略纳什均衡。我们发现，消费者学习的不对称性对零售商的最优服务水平、市场份额和利润有显著影响。当零售商具有不同的成本时，它也决定了低成本零售商所享有的竞争优势的程度。
We develop a model of consumer learning and choice behavior in response to uncertain service in the marketplace. Learning could be asymmetric, that is, consumers may associate different weights with positive and negative experiences. Under this consumer model, we characterize the steady-state distribution of demand for retailers given that each retailer holds a constant in-stock service level. We then consider a noncooperative game in steady state between two retailers competing on the basis of their service levels. The demand distributions of retailers in this game are modeled using a multiplicative aggregate market-share model in which the mean demands are obtained from the steady-state results for individual purchases, but the model is simplified in other respects for tractability. Our model yields a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We show that asymmetry in consumer learning has a significant impact on the optimal service levels, market shares, and profits of the retailers. When retailers have different costs, it also determines the extent of competitive advantage enjoyed by the lower-cost retailer.