CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis
CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis
复制标题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.169528
复制
发表时间：
1998-02
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Yermack;Anil Shivdasani
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Yermack;Anil Shivdasani
我们研究了CEO参与新董事的选择是否会影响董事会任命的性质。当首席执行官在提名委员会任职或不存在提名委员会时，公司任命的独立外部董事会减少，而有利益冲突的灰色局外人会增多。当CEO参与董事选择时，股价对独立董事任命的反应显著降低。我们的证据可能阐明了ceo用来减轻主动监督压力的一种机制，我们发现最近有一种趋势，即公司将ceo从董事选择中剔除。
We study whether CEO involvement in the selection of new directors influences the nature of appointments to the board. When the CEO serves on the nominating committee or no nominating committee exists, firms appoint fewer independent outside directors and more gray outsiders with conflicts of interest. Stock price reactions to independent director appointments are significantly lower when the CEO is involved in director selection. Our evidence may illuminate a mechanism used by CEOs to reduce pressure from active monitoring, and we find a recent trend of companies removing CEOs from involvement in director selection.