REPUTATION ACQUISITION IN DEBT MARKETS
REPUTATION ACQUISITION IN DEBT MARKETS
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DOI：
10.1086/261630
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发表时间：
1989-08-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
DIAMOND, DW
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
DIAMOND, DW
本文研究了声誉的形成以及声誉的激励效应随时间的演变，以缓解借款人和贷款人之间的利益冲突。借款人将贷款收益用于资助项目。在没有声誉效应的情况下，借款人有动机选择风险过高的项目。如果存在足够的逆向选择，声誉最初不会为信用记录较短的借款人提供更好的激励。随着时间的推移，如果获得了良好的声誉，声誉将提供更好的激励。确定了声誉需要时间才能发挥作用的市场的一般特征。
This paper studies reputation formation and the evolution over time of the incentive effects of reputation to mitigate conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders. Borrowers use the proceeds of their loans to fund projects. In the absence of reputation effects, borrowers have incentives to select excessively risky projects. If there is sufficient adverse selection, reputation will not initially provide improved incentives to borrowers with short credit histories. Over time, if a good reputation is acquired, reputation will provide improved incentives. General characteristics of markets in which reputation takes time to work are identified.