Is Group Lending A Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving High Repayment Rates?: Evidence from Field Experiments in Vietnam
Is Group Lending A Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving High Repayment Rates?: Evidence from Field Experiments in Vietnam
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团体贷款是实现高还款率的良好执行计划吗？：来自越南实地实验的证据
DOI：
10.11179/ker.75.35
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hisaki Kono
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hisaki Kono
小额信贷机构采用了多种激励方案，但由于内生性偏差，估计每种方案的效果并不容易。我们在越南进行了实地实验，以了解连带责任、监控、交叉报告、社会制裁、沟通和群体形成在借款人还款行为中的作用。我们发现连带责任合同会导致严重的搭便车问题，导致战略性违约并降低还款率。当群体成员观察彼此的投资回报时，参与者更有可能选择战略默认。即使在借款人之间引入交叉报告制度和/或惩罚措施后，连带责任下的违约率和选择策略性违约的参与者比例仍然高于个人贷款。我们还发现，连带责任贷款往往无法促使借款人之间形成相互保险。那些在上一轮中得到帮助或偿还了少量资金的人更有可能战略性违约并在本轮中再次偿还少量资金，而那些支付大额资金的人总是同一个人。
Microfinance institutions employ various kinds of incentive schemes but estimating the effect of each scheme is not easy due to endogeneity bias. We conducted field experiments in Vietnam to capture the role of joint liability, monitoring, cross-reporting, social sanctions, communication and group formation in borrowers' repayment behavior. We find that joint liability contracts cause serious free-riding problems, inducing strategic default and lowering repayment rates. When group members observe each others' investment returns, participants are more likely to choose strategic default. Even after introducing a cross-reporting system and/or penalties among borrowers, the default rates and the ratios of participants who chose strategic default under joint liability are still higher than those under individual lending. We also find that joint liability lending often failed to induce mutual insurance among borrowers. Those who had been helped or who had repaid a little in the previous round were more likely to default strategically and repay a little again in the current round and those who paid large amounts were always the same individuals.