Concepts are not represented by conscious imagery
Concepts are not represented by conscious imagery
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DOI：
10.3758/pbr.16.5.914
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发表时间：
2009-10-01
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
Schifferstein, Hendrik N. J.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Pecher, Diane;van Dantzig, Saskia;Schifferstein, Hendrik N. J.
根据扎根认知理论，概念表征和感知共享处理机制。我们研究了这种重叠是否是由于有意识的感知意象造成的。参与者填写问卷来评估其意象的生动程度（心理意象问卷）以及意象面向对象和空间的程度（对象空间意象问卷），并执行心理旋转任务。一周后，他们执行了一项口头财产核实任务。在这项任务中，模态转换效应证明了模态特定系统的参与，发现在相同模态试验（例如，钻石闪光）后目标试验（例如，苹果绿）的性能比在不同模态试验（例如，飞机噪音）后更好。结果显示存在模态转换效应，但意象得分与模态转换之间没有系统关系。我们的结论是，有意识的心理意象并不是概念表征的基础。
According to theories of grounded cognition, conceptual representation and perception share processing mechanisms. We investigated whether this overlap is due to conscious perceptual imagery. Participants filled out questionnaires to assess the vividness of their imagery (Questionnaire on Mental Imagery) and the extent to which their imagery was object oriented and spatially oriented (Object-Spatial Imagery Questionnaire), and they performed a mental rotation task. One week later, they performed a verbal property verification task. In this task, involvement of modality-specific systems is evidenced by the modality-switch effect, the finding that performance on a target trial (e.g., apple-green) is better after a same-modality trial (e.g., diamond-sparkle) than after a different-modality trial (e.g., airplane-noisy). Results showed a modality-switch effect, but there was no systematic relation between imagery scores and modality switch. We conclude that conscious mental imagery is not fundamental to conceptual representation.