Bidding for a group-specific public-good prize
Bidding for a group-specific public-good prize
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申办特定群体公益奖
DOI：
10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00139-0
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Sunghyun Na
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Baik;In;Sunghyun Na
我们研究了在一场竞赛中，两个群体相互竞争以赢得一个群体特定的公共物品奖，玩家同时独立地选择他们的努力水平，获胜的群体由全付拍卖的选择规则决定。我们首先证明了纯策略纳什均衡的不存在性，然后构造了一个混合策略纳什均衡。在纳什均衡中，每一组中唯一活跃的参与者是该组中对奖品估价最高的参与者;所有其他参与者的努力都是零;均衡努力水平只取决于两个值-每组中对奖品的最高估价。
We examine the equilibrium effort levels of individual players and groups in a contest in which two groups compete with each other to win a group-specific public-good prize, the players choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently, and the winning group is determined by the selection rule of all-pay auctions. We first prove nonexistence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and then construct a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. At the Nash equilibrium, the only active player in each group is a player whose valuation for the prize is the highest in that group; all the other players expend zero effort; and the equilibrium effort levels depend solely on two values — the highest valuation for the prize in each group.