MONOPOLY AND PRODUCT QUALITY
MONOPOLY AND PRODUCT QUALITY
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DOI：
10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6
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发表时间：
1978-01-01
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
ROSEN, S
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
MUSSA, M;ROSEN, S
本文考虑一类垄断定价问题，涉及一个商人可能称之为产品线，质量差异的频谱相同的通用类型的商品。虽然商品是相似的，但它们并不是完美的替代品，因为所有的客户都不会对商品的所有属性进行估价。卖方知道市场上的品味和需求的大致分布情况，但不能在实际销售之前在买方中进行分销，也不能阻止在其他市场上转售。因此，垄断者不能从事通常的价格决策，而是在一个非人格化的市场上以“要么接受，要么放弃”的方式提供商品，卖方利用定价政策（价格-质量表）的可能性，通过自我选择的过程，沿着质量范围沿着分配顾客。最优策略“消除“了消费者的偏好，分离了市场，并将不同的顾客类型分配给不同种类的商品，从而允许对不同需求强度的消费者进行部分歧视。假设买方购买一单位商品，生产某一特定品种的成本是恒定的，而质量较高的商品的边际成本是递增的，那么垄断者出售给任何顾客的商品的质量几乎总是低于竞争条件下购买的商品的质量。一般来说，这是通过增加相对于边际成本的价格-质量梯度的斜率来实现的。此外，垄断者经常将需求强度最小的顾客挤出市场，同时出售比竞争性组织市场更广泛的质量。最后，需求条件可能是这样的，卖方完全分离所有市场并不值得，而是将其集中起来。消费者对同一种产品的口味。这一策略是通过在价格-质量计划表中设置角来艾德的，这样，
This paper considers a class of monopoly pricing problems involving what a businessman might call a product line, a quality-differentiated spectrum of goods of the same generic type. While the goods are similar, they are not perfect substitutes because all customers do not place the valuations on all attributes of the goods. The seller knows the ge distribution of tastes and demands in the market, but cannot dist~~ g~ isb among buyers prior to an actual sale and cannot prevent resale in other markets. Therefore, the monopolist cannot engage in the usual sort of price d~ scr~ rni~ at~ on. Instead, the goods are offered in an impersonal market on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and the seller exploits the possibilities for a pricing policy (a price-quality schedule) to allocate customers along the quality spectrum by a process of self-selection. The optimal policy ““smokes~ ut’~ consumer preferences, separates markets, and assigns different customer types to different varieties of goods, thereby permitting partial discrimination among consumers of varying intensities of demand. Assuming that buyers purchase one unit of the good and that there are constant costs of producing a given variety and increasing marginal costs of higher quality items, it is established that the monopolist almost always reduces the quality sold to any customer compared with what would be purchased under competition. Generally speaking this is done by increasing the slope of the price-quality gradient offered relative to marginal cost. Furthermore, the monopolist frequently prices customers with the least intensities of demand out of the market, while at the same time selling broader range of qualities than would be offered in competitively organize markets, Finally, demand conditions may be such that it does not pay the seller to separate all markets completely, but rather to bunch. customers of diEererat tastes onto the same product. This maneuver is a~ c~ rn~~ is~ ed by imparting corners in the price-quality schedule, so that customers with 301