Public-Private Partnerships and the Privatization of Financing: An Incomplete Contracts Approach
Public-Private Partnerships and the Privatization of Financing: An Incomplete Contracts Approach
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1014270
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发表时间：
2007-08
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jean-Etienne de Bettignies;T. W. Ross
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jean-Etienne de Bettignies;T. W. Ross
各国政府已开始采用公私合作伙伴关系（P3）作为提供公共服务的工具。本文探讨了公共项目的私人融资何时是最佳的这一有争议的问题。私人发展可以通过更有效地终止不良项目的决策来主导公共融资，从而解决软预算约束问题。另一方面，由于合同的不完整性和外部性，私人开发商无法承诺偿还大量债务，因此只能为一小部分有价值的项目提供融资。公共开发商不会面临同样的承诺问题，可以为更多的项目提供资金。
Governments have begun to embrace public-private partnerships (P3s) as vehicles for providing public services. This paper considers the controversial question of when private financing of public projects is optimal. Private development can dominate public financing through more efficient termination decisions for bad projects, resolving soft budget constraint problems. Due to contractual incompleteness and externalities, on the other hand, private developers cannot commit to large debt repayments, and hence can finance only a subset of valuable projects. Public developers, who do not face the same commitment problems, can finance a larger set of projects.