Disentangling Insurance and Information in Intertemporal Consumption Choices
Disentangling Insurance and Information in Intertemporal Consumption Choices
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解开跨期消费选择中的保险和信息
DOI：
10.1257/aer.99.2.387
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Luigi Pistaferri
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Katja Kaufmann;Luigi Pistaferri
教科书版本的生命周期永久收入假设没有流动性约束，预测消费对（未预料到的）暂时收入变化的反应非常温和，对永久收入变化的反应非常强烈。这一预测对于理解消费者对退税或为稳定目的而增加的税收的反应具有重要的政策含义。近年来，人们对估计这些重要参数重新产生了兴趣，或者使用准实验数据，（如家庭收到退税支票的时间随机化;参见大卫约翰逊、乔纳森帕克和尼古拉斯苏莱莱斯（2006）），或对消费者面临的随机收入过程施加结构性限制（Orazio Attanasio和Nicola Pavoni，2008）; Richard Blundell，Luigi Pistaferri，and Ian普雷斯顿2008; Jonathan Heathcote，Kjetil Storesletten，and Giovanni L. Violante 2007;准实验研究的主要反对意见是，研究结果可能是特定于具体情况的。第二部分文献的主要问题是，对消费对收入冲击的反应的估计可能混淆了两个问题，即保险和信息。一方面，该估计反映了家庭通过各种渠道（如自我保险、政府提供的保险、信贷市场或其他非正式机制）平滑消费的能力（或缺乏这种能力）。另一方面，识别策略需要能够在统计上将什么是冲击与什么是预期事件（当从
The textbook version of the life-cycle perma-nent income hypothesis with no liquidity con-straints predicts that consumption should react very mildly to (unanticipated) transitory income changes and very strongly to permanent ones. This prediction has important policy implica-tions in understanding the response of consum-ers to tax rebates or increases that are made for stabilization purposes. In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in estimating these important parameters, either using quasi-experimental data (such as randomization of the timing when tax rebate checks are received by households; see David Johnson, Jonathan Parker, and Nicholas Souleles 2006), or imposing struc-tural restrictions on the stochastic income pro-cess faced by consumers (Orazio Attanasio and Nicola Pavoni 2008; Richard Blundell, Luigi Pistaferri, and Ian Preston 2008; Jonathan Heathcote, Kjetil Storesletten, and Giovanni L. Violante 2007; Giorgio Primiceri and Thijs van Rens, forthcoming).The main objection of quasi-experimental stud-ies is that the results may be context-specific. The main problem with the second strand of the litera-ture is that estimates of the response of consump -tion to income shocks may confound two issues, insurance and information. On the one hand, the estimate reflects the ability (or lack thereof) of the household to smooth consumption through a variety of channels, such as self-insurance, gov -ernment-provided insurance, credit markets, or other informal mechanisms. On the other hand, the identification strategy requires the ability to statistically separate what is a shock from what is an anticipated event (when seen from the point of