Underlying social dilemmas in mixed traffic flow with lane changes
Underlying social dilemmas in mixed traffic flow with lane changes
复制标题
混合交通流与变道的潜在社会困境
DOI：
10.1016/j.chaos.2022.111790
复制
发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sueyoshi;F.;Utsumi;S.;Tanimoto;J.
基于修正S-NFS模型，建立了一种新的元胞自动机交通模型，考虑了由紧凑型车辆、卡车和公共汽车组成的真实交通流场中agent最大速度分布的混合流系统。这些车辆被分配了两种不同的策略：合作者(C)，他保持在原来的车道上，而叛逃者(D)，他进行变道以最大化自己的收益，即平均速度。在一系列系统的多智能体模拟中，我们定量地比较了默认系统（所有智能体的最大速度都是恒定的）、混合交通流系统（允许最大速度的分布）和相关混合交通流中的流量特征，其中最大速度较高的智能体倾向于采用D策略，而最大速度较低的智能体倾向于采用C策略。我们将讨论在每个交通流系统中存在什么样的游戏类。此外，我们定量研究了社会效率赤字，这是一个两难程度的指标，为每个流动系统。
A new cellular automata traffic model based on Revised S-NFS model is established to consider a mixed flow system in which the maximal velocity of the agents is distributed, as is the case in a real traffic flow fields composed of compact vehicles, trucks, and buses. These vehicles are assigned on of two different strategies: cooperator (C), who remains in his original lane, and defector (D), who undertakes lane-changing to maximize his own payoff, i.e., average velocity. In a systematic series of multi-agent simulations, we quantitatively compare flow characteristics in the default system (where maximal velocity is constant across all agents), mixed traffic flow systems (which permit a distribution of maximal velocities), and correlated–mixed traffic flows, in which an agent with a higher maximal velocity tends to have a D strategy whereas one with a lower maximal velocity tends to have a C strategy. We discuss what kind of game class is underlying in each traffic flow system. Furthermore, we quantitatively study the social efficiency deficit, an index of dilemma extent, for each of the flow systems.