Entrepreneurial Pressure and Innovation
Entrepreneurial Pressure and Innovation
复制标题
创业压力与创新
DOI：
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Augustin Landier
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Amador;Augustin Landier
管理者会想到一些可以取代现有技术的想法。管理者在现有公司提供的合同和有竞争力的风险资本家提供的合同之间做出选择。在现有公司内部实施想法有成本和优势。依靠现有资产使实施成本更低。但它也降低了合同的灵活性，而在存在行为或信息摩擦的情况下，这种灵活性是有价值的。为了实现一个新的想法，现有的公司必须向经理支付一笔金额，这取决于风险资本家的出价。风险投资通过改变新想法的威胁和价格来影响现有企业的创新政策。在位企业的价值是内生的，与风险投资压力的强度负相关。由于合同灵活性的重要性，更多的创新项目往往在新企业中实施。在均衡状态下，创新与外部资本市场效率之间的关系是非单调的。如果边际创新是由在位者在外部压力下完成的，那么一个更好的风险资本市场会提高创新率。
Ideas occur to managers that can replace existing technologies. Managers choose between contracts offered by an existing firm and a competitive venture capitalist. Implementing ideas within the existing firm has costs and advantages. Relying on existing assets makes implementation cheaper. But it also reduces contractual flexibility which is valuable in the presence of behavioral or informational frictions. To implement a new idea, the incumbent firm has to pay the manager an amount that depends on the venture capitalist offer. Venture capital affects the innovation policy of incumbents by changing both the threat of new ideas and their price. The value of an incumbent firm is endogenous and negatively related to the intensity of venture capital pressure. More innovative projects tend to be implemented in new ventures because of the importance of contractual flexibility. In equilibrium, the relation between innovation and the effciency of external capital markets is non-monotonic. A better venture capital market increases the innovation rate if the marginal innovation is done by the incumbent under pressure from outside.