Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language

Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language
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DOI:
10.1111/1467-8284.00419
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发表时间:
2003-07-01
期刊:
影响因子:
1.6
通讯作者:
Knobe, J
Knobe, J
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Knobe, J

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一家公司的董事长决定实施一项新计划。他认为(1)该计划将为他的公司赚很多钱,(2)该计划还会产生一些其他的效果x。但董事长根本不在乎效果x。他实施新计划的唯一原因是他相信它会为公司赚很多钱。最终,一切都按预期进行:该程序为公司赚了很多钱,同时也产生了x效应。在这里,尽管董事长预见到x将由他的行为产生,但他并不关心x是否真的发生了。那么,我们可以说,x是他行为的“副作用”。我想在这里回答的问题是:我们是不是可以说主席是故意造成这种副作用的?这个问题涉及到关于正确分析故意行为概念的重大争议的核心。因此,例如,在Alfred Mele(2001)的分析中,说是故意带来副作用总是错误的。1相比之下,根据Michael Bratman(1984;1987)的分析,在某些情况下,确实可以说是故意造成的副作用。许多其他作家在这个问题上站在一边或另一边。现在,当我们遇到像这样的争议时,有时问问自己,人们通常会对正在讨论的情况说些什么,这有时是有帮助的。人们通常会说,一种行为的副作用是故意造成的吗?显然,在这里,普通语言并不构成终审法院。(即使人们通常认为副作用是故意的,我们也可以得出结论,它们确实是无意的。)尽管如此,对普通语言的测试似乎确实有可能为我们提供一些关于像这样的困难案例的有用指导。
The chairman of the board of a company has decided to implement a new program. He believes (1) that the program will make a lot of money for his company and (2) that the program will also produce some other effect x. But the chairman doesn't care at all about effect x. His sole reason for implementing the new program is that he believes it will make a lot of money for the company. In the end, everything proceeds as anticipated: the program makes a lot of money for the company and also produces effect x. Here it appears that, although the chairman foresaw that x would result from his behaviour, he did not care either way whether x actually occurred. Let us say, then, that x was a'side effect'of his behaviour. The question I want to address here is: Shall we say that the chairman brought about this side effect intentionally?This question goes to the heart of a major controversy regarding the proper analysis of the concept of intentional action. So, for example, on Alfred Mele's (2001) analysis, it is always wrong to say that a side effect was brought about intentionally. 1 By contrast, on Michael Bratman's (1984; 1987) analysis, there are circumstances under which side effects can truly be said to have been brought about intentionally. Numerous other authors have come down on one side or the other of this issue. Now, when we encounter a controversy like this one, it can sometimes be helpful to ask ourselves what people would ordinarily say about the situation under discussion. Would people ordinarily say that the side effects of a behaviour were brought about intentionally? Clearly, ordinary lan-guage does not here constitute a court of final appeal.(Even if it turns out that people ordinarily call side effects' intentional', we might conclude that they are truly unintentional.) Still, it does seem plausible that the exami-nation of ordinary language might provide us with some useful guidance about difficult cases like this one.