The Agency Problem, Corporate Governance, and the Asymmetrical Behavior of Selling, General, and Administrative Costs
The Agency Problem, Corporate Governance, and the Asymmetrical Behavior of Selling, General, and Administrative Costs
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1209162
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发表时间：
2012-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Clara Xiaoling Chen;Hai-fan Lu;Theodore Sougiannis
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文献类型：
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作者：
Clara Xiaoling Chen;Hai-fan Lu;Theodore Sougiannis
先前的研究已经记录了销售、一般和管理（SG&A）成本的不对称行为（即，SG&A成本在活动增加时的增加幅度大于活动福尔斯减少时的减少幅度），并主要用经济因素解释了这一现象。借鉴代理理论，我们认为，SG&A成本不对称不仅是由经济因素，但也由代理问题，导致SG&A成本不对称远离其最优水平的转变。使用1996-2005年期间的S&P 1500公司的数据，我们发现，SG&A成本不对称的程度与管理者的帝国建设的动机，由于代理问题（衡量自由现金流和CEO的视野，任期和薪酬结构），这表明代理问题提供了一个额外的解释SG&A成本不对称。此外，我们发现，强有力的公司治理减轻代理问题和SG&A成本不对称程度之间的正相关。在另外的分析中，我们还发现，代理问题的影响成本粘性在更大程度上在成熟的公司和公司的SG&A成本创造低的未来价值。
Prior studies have documented the asymmetrical behavior of selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs (i.e., SG&A costs increase more when activity rises than they decrease when activity falls), and have explained this phenomenon primarily with economic factors. Drawing on agency theory, we argue that SG&A cost asymmetry is driven not only by economic factors but also by the agency problem which causes a shift in SG&A cost asymmetry away from its optimal level. Using data for S&P 1500 firms over the period 1996–2005, we find that the degree of SG&A cost asymmetry is positively associated with managers’ empire building incentives due to the agency problem (measured by free cash flow and CEO horizon, tenure, and compensation structure), suggesting that the agency problem provides an additional explanation for SG&A cost asymmetry. Moreover, we find that strong corporate governance mitigates the positive association between the agency problem and the degree of SG&A cost asymmetry. In additional analyses, we also find that the agency problem influences cost stickiness to a greater extent in mature firms and in firms where SG&A costs create low future value.