47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2020, July 8-11, 2020, Saarbrücken, Germany (Virtual Conference)
47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2020, July 8-11, 2020, Saarbrücken, Germany (Virtual Conference)
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第 47 届自动机、语言和编程国际学术研讨会，ICALP 2020，2020 年 7 月 8-11 日，德国萨尔布吕肯（虚拟会议）
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发表时间：
2020
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通讯作者：
A. Czumaj
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作者：
A. Czumaj
在比特币系统中，矿工被激励加入系统，并通过用户支付的费用来验证交易。一个简单的“支付你的出价”拍卖已被用来确定交易费。最近，Lavi，Sattath和Zohar [8]提出了一种替代性的费用设计，称为垄断价格（MP）机制，旨在提高矿工的收入。虽然MP不是严格的激励相容（IC），但他们研究了该机制在iid分布下与IC的接近程度，并基于大量的模拟和一些分析证明了它几乎是渐进的IC。在本文中，我们证明了MP机制是几乎激励兼容的任何iid分布的用户数量的增长大。这适用于其他攻击，如分裂出价。我们还证明了[8]中的一个猜想，即MP在收入方面主导了RSOP拍卖（最初在Goldberg等人中定义。[5]用于数字商品）。这些结果支持MP作为比特币费用设计的候选者。此外，我们还探讨了激励相容性和一般收入之间可能存在的内在相关性。2012年ACM学科分类计算理论→算法设计与分析
In the Bitcoin system, miners are incentivized to join the system and validate transactions through fees paid by the users. A simple “pay your bid” auction has been employed to determine the transaction fees. Recently, Lavi, Sattath and Zohar [8] proposed an alternative fee design, called the monopolistic price (MP) mechanism, aimed at improving the revenue for the miners. Although MP is not strictly incentive compatible (IC), they studied how close to IC the mechanism is for iid distributions, and conjectured that it is nearly IC asymptotically based on extensive simulations and some analysis. In this paper, we prove that the MP mechanism is nearly incentive compatible for any iid distribution as the number of users grows large. This holds true with respect to other attacks such as splitting bids. We also prove a conjecture in [8] that MP dominates the RSOP auction in revenue (originally defined in Goldberg et al. [5] for digital goods). These results lend support to MP as a Bitcoin fee design candidate. Additionally, we explore some possible intrinsic correlations between incentive compatibility and revenue in general. 2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Design and analysis of algorithms