Execution of Provably Secure Assays on MEDA Biochips to Thwart Attacks
Execution of Provably Secure Assays on MEDA Biochips to Thwart Attacks
复制标题
对 MEDA 生物芯片执行可证明安全的检测以阻止攻击
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Karri
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tung;Mohammed Shayan;K. Chakrabarty;R. Karri
数字微流体生物芯片 (DMFB) 已成为 DNA 测序、临床化学和即时诊断的有前途的平台。最近的研究表明 DMFB 容易受到各种类型的恶意攻击。由于片上传感器资源的限制，迄今为止提出的防御措施仅提供安全的概率保证。微电极点阵列 (MEDA) 生物芯片是下一代 DMFB，能够感测片上液滴位置，并以液滴位置图的形式捕获。我们提出了一种安全机制，通过从液滴位置图重建测序图（即测定规范）并将其与黄金测序图进行比较来验证测定执行。我们证明，从一组液滴位置图（在测定期间）到一组可能的测序图存在独特的（一对一）映射。这种对策可以检测到由于攻击而导致的液滴位置图的任何偏差，因为所得的导出测序图与原始测序图不同构。我们通过模拟对现实生物测定的攻击来强调安全机制的强度。
Digital micro fluidic biochips (DMFBs) have emerged as a promising platform for DNA sequencing, clinical chemistry, and point-of-care diagnostics. Recent research has shown that DMFBs are susceptible to various types of malicious attacks. Defenses proposed thus far only offer probabilistic guarantees of security due to the limitation of on-chip sensor resources. A micro-electrode-dot-array (MEDA) biochip is a next-generation DMFB that enables the sensing of on-chip droplet locations, which are captured in the form of a droplet-location map. We propose a security mechanism that validates assay execution by reconstructing the sequencing graph (i.e., the assay specification) from the droplet-location maps and comparing it against the golden sequencing graph. We prove that there is a unique (one-to-one) mapping from the set of droplet-location maps (over the duration of the assay) to the set of possible sequencing graphs. Any deviation in the droplet-location maps due to an attack is detected by this countermeasure because the resulting derived sequencing graph is not isomorphic to the original sequencing graph. We highlight the strength of the security mechanism by simulating attacks on real-life bioassays.