Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy
Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy
复制标题
帕累托改进竞选财务政策
DOI：
10.1257/0002828041464443
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Stephen Coate
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Stephen Coate
本文认为，竞选资金政策，在捐款限制和匹配的公共融资的形式，可以帕累托改进，即使在非常乐观的假设下，竞选广告的作用和选民的理性。乐观的假设是，候选人使用竞选捐款向选民传达关于他们任职资格的真实信息，选民根据他们所看到的信息理性地更新他们的信念。该论点还假设竞选捐款是由利益集团提供的，候选人可以提供政策优惠以吸引更多的捐款。
This paper argues that campaign finance policy, in the form of contribution limits and matching public financing, can be Pareto improving even under very optimistic assumptions concerning the role of campaign advertising and the rationality of voters. The optimistic assumptions are that candidates use campaign contributions to convey truthful information to voters about their qualifications for office and that voters update their beliefs rationally on the basis of the information they have seen. The argument also assumes that campaign contributions are provided by interest groups and that candidates can offer to provide policy favors to attract higher contributions.