Models of Sovereign Debt: Partial versus General Reputations
Models of Sovereign Debt: Partial versus General Reputations
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主权债务模型：部分声誉与一般声誉
DOI：
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Kehoe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Harold L. Cole;P. Kehoe
一些经济学家认为，只要政府能够通过海外储蓄获得市场回报率，标准的声誉模型就无法支持债务。作者认为，这些标准的声誉模型是局部的代理人在一个竞技场的行动只影响声誉的竞技场。作者开发了一个声誉的一般模型，如果一个政府在一种关系中被认为是不可信的，那么这个政府在其他关系中也会被认为是不可信的。他们表明，他们的一般声誉模型可以支持大量的债务。1998年由宾夕法尼亚大学经济系和大坂大学社会经济研究协会版权所有。
Some economists argue that as long as governments can earn the market rate of return by saving abroad, standard reputation models cannot support debt. The authors argue that these standard reputation models are partial in the sense that actions of agents in one arena affect reputation in that arena only. The authors develop a general model of reputation in which if a government is viewed as untrustworthy in one relationship this government will he viewed as untrustworthy in other relationships. They show that their general model of reputation can support large amounts of debt. Copyright 1998 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.