Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
复制标题
具有可验证消息的战略信息传输
DOI：
10.2307/2171817
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Eyal Winter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Daniel J. Seidmann;Eyal Winter
如果发送者的偏好在接收者的行动中是单调的，那么已知的是，在具有可验证消息的发送者-接收者博弈的每个顺序均衡中，偏好揭示了其类型（参见，例如，Milgrom（1981））。单调性是社会情境（如买卖关系）中的一种自然条件;但显然，在其他情境中，单调性的理想行动会因其类型而异。因此，我们推广Milgrom的结果，取代单调性与更一般的条件，在可验证的消息游戏的偏好，这是足够的存在性和唯一性的充分揭示平衡。这些条件包括偏好满足Crawford-Sobel（1982）对廉价谈话游戏施加的条件的所有游戏。
IF THE SENDER'S PREFERENCES are monotonic in the Receiver's action, then it is known that the Sender reveals its type in every sequential equilibrium of a Sender-Receiver game with verifiable messages (see, e.g., Milgrom (1981)). Monotonicity is a natural condition in social situations such as buyer-seller relationships; but there are obviously other situations in which the ideal action for a Sender varies with its type. Accordingly, we generalize Milgrom's result by replacing monotonicity with more general conditions on the Sender's preferences, which are sufficient for existence and uniqueness of a fully revealing equilibrium in verifiable message games. These conditions include all games in which preferences satisfy the conditions which Crawford-Sobel (1982) imposed on cheap talk games.