Enforcement Sharing and Commercial Piracy
Enforcement Sharing and Commercial Piracy
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执法共享和商业盗版
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Dyuti Banerjee
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Dyuti Banerjee
本文运用一个战略性进入-威慑框架，分析了政府与垄断者在打击商业盗版中的执法分担效果。垄断者是现有的公司，负责监测商业盗版者的非法经营，可能的进入者，非法复制和销售垄断者未经授权的副本的产品。垄断者承担监管成本，政府负责制定惩罚措施。我们发现，即使当执法共享的社会最优的惩罚可能会导致没有盗版的均衡，只有当政府是敏感的盗版。
This paper uses a strategic entry-deterrence framework to analyze the effects of enforcement sharing between the government and the monopolist in dealing with commercial copyright piracy. The monopolist is the incumbent firm and is responsible for monitoring the illegal operations of a commercial pirate, the possible entrant, who illegally reproduces and sells unauthorized copies of the monopolists product. The monopolist bears the monitoring cost and the government is responsible for setting a penalty. We show that even when enforcement is shared the socially optimal penalty may result in no piracy in equilibrium only if the government is sensitive to piracy.