Sustainable plans and mutual default
Sustainable plans and mutual default
复制标题
可持续计划和相互违约
DOI：
10.2307/2297817
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发表时间：
1990
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
P. Kehoe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
V. Chari;P. Kehoe
本文提出了一个简单的最优税收一般均衡模型，其中私人代理人和政府都可能违约。作为基准，我们考虑拉姆齐均衡，在这种均衡中，政府可以在一开始就预先承诺其政策，但私人代理人可以违约。然后，我们考虑可持续均衡，其中政府和私人代理的决策规则都要求是顺序理性的。我们采用Abreu（1988）的最优触发策略来完全表征整个可持续均衡集。特别是，我们表明，当贴现率足够小，政府消费波动足够大时，拉姆齐分配和政策（政府从不违约）可以得到可持续均衡的支持。通过一个例子，我们表明，政府消费的差异越大，越容易支持良好的结果。我们还表明，对于适度的贴现因素，在最佳可持续均衡中，税率波动更大，债务比拉姆齐均衡更小。
This paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of optimal taxation in which both private agents and the government can default on their debt. As a benchmark we consider Ramsey equilibria in which the government can precommit to its policies at the beginning of time, but in which private agents can default. We then consider sustainable equilibria in which both government and private agent decision rules are required to be sequentially rational. We adapt Abreu's (1988) optimal trigger strategies to completely characterize the entire set of sustainable equilibria. In particular, we show that when there is sufficiently little discounting and government consumption fluctuates enough, the Ramsey allocations and policies (in which the government never defaults) can be supported by a sustainable equilibrium. By way of an example we show that the larger the variance of government consumption the easier it is to support good outcomes. We also show for moderate discount factors that in the best sustainable equilibrium, tax rates are more volatile and debt is smaller than in the Ramsey equilibrium.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
ABREU, D
通讯作者：
ABREU, D