European Union Meets South Korea: Bureaucratic Interests, Exporter Discrimination and the Negotiations of Trade Agreements
European Union Meets South Korea: Bureaucratic Interests, Exporter Discrimination and the Negotiations of Trade Agreements
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欧盟与韩国会面：官僚利益、出口商歧视和贸易协定谈判
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02243.x
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Dupont
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Manfred Elsig;C. Dupont
欧盟谁在推动双边贸易谈判进程？与社会解释相反，本文就欧盟委员会如何管理这一过程并以战略方式利用其地位来追求其利益提出了新颖的论点。本文植根于委托代理理论，讨论了代理人偏好，并对代理人设定特定焦点并与委托人和第三方进行战略性互动的条件进行了理论化。该论点是通过案例研究证据进行讨论的，该证据取自欧盟委员会 2006 年宣布其新战略以来缔结和批准的第一个贸易协定：欧盟-韩国贸易协定。
Who in the European Union drives the process of pursuing bilateral trade negotiations? In contrast to societal explanations, this article develops a novel argument as to how the European Commission manages the process and uses its position in strategic ways to pursue its interests. Rooted in principal–agent theory, the article discusses agent preferences and theorizes the conditions under which the agent sets specific focal points and interacts strategically with principals and third parties. The argument is discussed with case study evidence drawn from the first trade agreement concluded and ratified since the EU Commission announced its new strategy in 2006: the EU–South Korea trade agreement.