Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
复制标题
高效和接近高效的合作伙伴关系
DOI：
10.2307/2298126
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发表时间：
1993
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Steven A. Matthews
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Legros;Steven A. Matthews
本文从两个方面表明，搭便车对确定性伙伴关系绩效的影响程度可能比通常认为的要小。首先，提供了伙伴关系保持充分效率的充分必要条件。这意味着许多重要的伙伴关系可以维持效率，例如具有有限行动空间的一般伙伴关系，以及具有Leontief技术的新古典伙伴关系。其次，近似效率可以在一个大的伙伴关系类别中实现，包括光滑单调的生产函数和负效用函数。近似效率是通过混合策略均衡实现的：一方以小概率采取低效行动。效率的近似程度仅受合伙人所能承担的责任数量的限制。尽管如此，它们的均衡支付并不是任意大的。
This paper shows in two ways that the degree to which free-riding diminishes the performance of deterministic partnerships may be less than has been generally thought. First, a necessary and sufficient condition is provided for a partnership to sustain full efficiency. It implies that many non-trivial partnerships sustain efficiency, such as generic ones with finite action spaces, and neoclassical ones with Leontief technologies. Second, approximate efficiency is shown to be achievable in a large class of partnerships, including ones with smooth and monotonic production and disutility functions. Approximate efficiency is achieved by mixed-strategy equilibria: one partner takes, with small probability, an inefficient action. The degree to which efficiency is approximated is restricted only by the amount of liability the partners can bear. Nonetheless, their equilibrium payments are not arbitrarily large.