Exclusive Content in Two-Sided Markets
Exclusive Content in Two-Sided Markets
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双边市场的独家内容
DOI：
10.1111/jems.12427
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Akifumi Ishihara and Ryoko Oki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
大石亜希子;岩﨑一郎・馬欣欣・溝端佐登史;Akifumi Ishihara and Ryoko Oki
本研究探讨了在允许双方加入多个平台的双边市场中独家内容提供的作用。我们考虑一个双垄断的双边平台市场模型，其中一方是垄断的多产品公司（内容提供商），另一方是消费者。该模型表明，垄断性内容提供商利用排他性作为战略承诺来平衡其议价能力的两种相反影响：多址消费者增加带来的积极影响和分销渠道限制带来的消极影响。
This study investigates the role of exclusive content provision in two‐sided markets in which both sides are allowed to join multiple platforms. We consider a model of duopolistic two‐sided platform market with a monopolistic multiproduct firm (content provider) on one side and consumers on the other. The model demonstrates that the monopolistic content provider uses exclusivity as strategic commitment to balance two opposite effects on its bargaining power: the positive effect caused by the increase in multihoming consumers and the negative effect caused by the restriction of distribution channels.