Does the US Tax Code Favor Automation?
Does the US Tax Code Favor Automation?
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DOI：
10.1353/eca.2020.0003
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发表时间：
2020-03-01
影响因子：
5.9
通讯作者：
Restrepo, Pascual
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Acemoglu, Daron;Manera, Andrea;Restrepo, Pascual
我们认为，美国的税收制度对劳动力有偏见，对资本有利，而且近年来变得更加如此。因此，它推动了自动化水平的提高，超出了社会所期望的水平。从2010年代的美国税收制度转向对资本和劳动力的最佳税收，将使就业率提高4.02%，劳动力份额提高0.78个百分点，并恢复最佳自动化水平。如果转向最优税收是不可行的，那么更温和的改革仍然可以增加1.14- 1.96%的就业，但在这种情况下，征收额外的自动化税以降低自动化的均衡水平也是有益的。这是因为边际自动化任务不会带来太多的生产率提高，而是取代工人，使就业率低于社会最佳水平。我们还表明，降低劳动税或将较低的资本税与自动化税相结合，可以比2000年至2018年期间实施的资本税统一削减更能增加就业。
We argue that the US tax system is biased against labor and in favor of capital and has become more so in recent years. As a consequence, it has promoted levels of automation beyond what is socially desirable. Moving from the US tax system in the 2010s to optimal taxation of capital and labor would raise employment by 4.02 percent and the labor share by 0.78 percentage point and restore the optimal level of automation. If moving to optimal taxes is infeasible, more modest reforms can still increase employment by 1.14-1.96 percent, but in this case it is also beneficial to impose an additional automation tax to reduce the equilibrium level of automation. This is because marginal automated tasks do not bring much productivity gains but displace workers, reducing employment below its socially optimal level. We additionally show that reducing labor taxes or combining lower capital taxes with automation taxes can increase employment much more than the uniform reductions in capital taxes enacted between 2000 and 2018.