Hard Rules and Soft Constraints: regulating conflict of interest in China
Hard Rules and Soft Constraints: regulating conflict of interest in China
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DOI：
10.1080/10670564.2012.716941
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发表时间：
2013-01-01
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Ren, Jianming
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gong, Ting;Ren, Jianming
本文开头几段概述了这一特别部分的广泛主题，提请注意不断变化的腐败观念和定义以及大中华地区的预防腐败做法。文章的其余部分集中在一个特定的主题：利益冲突和腐败之间的关系，在理论上和在中国大陆的应用。利益冲突的概念是与公务有关的公共利益与私人领域的利益之间的不相容。这种冲突并不总是必然导致腐败，并可能与之区分开来。通过研究它们在中国的监管方式，我们认为，尽管已经建立了一个复杂的规则网络，但如果没有志同道合的公务员的支持性价值框架，仅靠法规无法保证道德上的良好行为。规则需要解释，如果这种酌处权意味着公务员选择遵循与规则相冲突的行政文化和个人价值观，那么这些规则将不会产生什么影响。硬规则可能意味着软约束。
The initial paragraphs of this article outline the broad themes of this special section, drawing attention to changing perceptions and definitions of corruption and to corruption prevention practices in Greater China. The remainder of the article focuses on a particular theme: the relationship between conflicts of interest and corruption in both theoretical terms and in its application in mainland China. Conflicts of interest are conceptualized as the incompatibility between the public interest associated with official duties and interests derived from the private domain. Such conflicts do not always necessarily lead to corruption and may be distinguished from it. By examining the way in which they are regulated in China, we argue that although an intricate web of rules has been established, regulations alone cannot guarantee ethically sound behaviour if there is no supportive value framework of like-minded civil servants. Rules require interpretation and if this discretion means that civil servants choose to follow an administrative culture and personal values that conflict with the regulations, they will have little effect. Hard rules may mean soft constraints.