The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Security Market Behavior: Early Evidence
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Security Market Behavior: Early Evidence
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2002 年萨班斯-奥克斯利法案和证券市场行为：早期证据
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.498083
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
P. Jain
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Z. Rezaee;P. Jain
2002年的《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》（以下简称《法案》）是针对众多公司和会计丑闻而颁布的，旨在加强公司问责制和专业责任，以恢复投资者对美国公司的信心。本研究考察了市场对该法案的反应，发现在几个立法事件增加（减少）该法案通过的可能性时，出现了正（负）异常回报。我们发现，该法案是财富增加的平均水平，市场的反应是更积极的更合规的公司与有效的公司治理，可靠的财务报告，和可信的审计职能之前，其颁布。投资者将该法案解读为好消息，并恢复了投资者对公共金融信息的信心。总的来说，我们的研究结果表明，该法案的诱导利益显着超过其强加的合规成本。
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the Act) was enacted in response to numerous corporate and accounting scandals, and was aimed at reinforcing corporate accountability and professional responsibility in order to restore investor confidence in corporate America. This study examines the market reaction to the Act and finds a positive (negative) abnormal return at the time of several legislative events that increased (decreased) the likelihood of the passage of the Act. We find that the Act was wealth-increasing on average, and that the market reaction is more positive for more compliant firms with effective corporate governance, reliable financial reporting, and credible audit functions prior to its enactment. Investors interpreted the Act as good news and led toward the restoration of investor confidence in public financial information. Overall, our results suggest that the induced benefits of the Act significantly outweigh its imposed compliance costs.