Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Problem in the Japanese Medical Match and Its Solution
Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Problem in the Japanese Medical Match and Its Solution
复制标题
约束匹配的稳定性和策略验证性：日本医疗匹配中的一个问题及其解决方案
DOI：
10.1257/aer.102.3.366
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
F. Kojima
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yuichiro Kamada;F. Kojima
真正的配对市场受到限制。例如，日本政府在2009年引入了一项新的医疗配对制度，在其47个县中的每个县都设置了“地区上限”，规定了每个地区可以雇用的医疗居民总数。本文在Kamada和Kojima(2011)的基础上，通过详细考察日本的医疗配对市场，研究了具有这种约束的配对市场。具体地说，我们表明，2009年引入的新系统在稳定性和防策性方面存在问题，并提供了一种做得更好的替代机制。
Real matching markets are subject to constraints. For example, the Japanese government introduced a new medical matching system in 2009 that imposes a "regional cap" in each of its 47 prefectures, which regulates the total number of medical residents who can be employed in each region. Based on Kamada and Kojima (2011), this paper studies matching markets with such constraints by examining in great detail the Japanese medical matching market. Specifically, we show that the new system introduced in 2009 has problems in terms of stability and strategy-proofness, and provide an alternative mechanism that does better.