The Paradox of Redistribution: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results
The Paradox of Redistribution: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results
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再分配的悖论：一些理论和经验结果
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-662-00411-1_25
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发表时间：
1981
期刊：
影响因子：
5.8
通讯作者：
A. Schotter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Schotter
在博弈论中，众所周知，一个成员在投票机构中的投票权重并不能很好地代表他在该机构中的投票权或影响力。这个事实很容易说明。例如，考虑投票机构V =（50%; 35%; 45%; 20%）其中50%是组织中使用的投票规则-如果任何成员以50%或更多的选票组成联盟，他们就是获胜的，可以做出对整个机构有约束力的决定-而35%，45%和20%分别是选民1、2和3的投票权重。因此，在这个机构中，虽然权重不是平均分配的，但很容易看出，在50%多数规则下，所有成员确实具有同等的权力，因为任何选民都不能单独赢得一票，任何两个或两个以上选民的联盟都会获胜。因此，很明显，投票权重不是投票权的完美代理。然而，随之而来的问题是，它们作为代理有多糟糕？换句话说，如果我们增加（或减少）一个投票人在投票机构中的投票权重，他在组织中的影响力是否总是增加（或减少），尽管可能与他的权重增加不成比例，或者他在组织中的影响力实际上是否会减少（增加）？
It is widely known among game theorists that the voting weight a member has in a voting body is not a good proxy for his voting power or influence within the body. This fact is easily illustrated. For instance, consider the voting body V = (50 %; 35 %; 45 %; 20 %) where 50 % is the voting rule used in the organization — if any members form a coalition with 50 % or more of the votes, they are winning and can make decisions that are binding on the entire body — and 35 %, 45 % and 20 % are the voting weights of voters 1,2 and 3, respectively. In this body then, although the weights are not distributed equally, it is easy to see that all the members are indeed equally powerful under the 50 % majority rule, since any voter cannot win a vote by himself and any coalition of two or more voters is winning. Consequently, it is clear that voting weights are not perfect proxies for voting power. The question that arises, however, is how bad a proxy are they? In other words, if we were to increase (or decrease) a voter’s voting weight within a voting body would his resulting influence within the organization always increase (or decrease), although possibly not in proportion to the increase in his weight, or could his influence within the organization actually decrease (increase)?