The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science
The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science
复制标题
测量在现代物理科学中的作用
作者:
T. Kuhn
AT the University of Chicago, the facade of the Social Science Research Building bears Lord Kelvin's famous dictum: "If you cannot measure, your knowledge is meager and unsatisfactory."' Would that statement be there if it had been written, not by a physicist, but by a sociologist, political scientist, or economist? Or again, would terms like "meter reading" and "yardstick" recur so frequently in contemporary discussions of epistemology and scientific method were it not for the prestige of modern physical science and the fact that measurement so obviously bulks large in its research? Suspecting that the answer to both these questions is no, I find my assigned role in this conference particularly challenging. Because physical science is so often seen as the paradigm of sound knowledge and because quantitative techniques seem to provide an essential clue to its success, the question how measurement has actually functioned for the past three centuries in physical science arouses more than its natural and intrinsic interest. Let me therefore make my general position clear at the start. Both as an ex-physicist and as an historian of physical science I feel sure that, for at least a century and a half, quantitative methods have indeed been central to the development of the fields I study. On the other hand, I feel equally convinced that our most prevalent notions both about the function of measurement and about the source of its special efficacy are derived largely from myth. Partly because of this conviction and partly for more autobiographical reasons,2 I shall employ in this paper an approach rather different from that of most other contributors to this conference. Until almost its close my essay will include no narrative of the increasing deployment of quantitative techniques in physical science since the close of the Middle Ages. Instead, the two