Embedding social dilemmas in intergroup competition reduces free-riding
Embedding social dilemmas in intergroup competition reduces free-riding
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DOI：
10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.08.005
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发表时间：
2006-11-01
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Rapoport, Amnon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gunnthorsdottir, Anna;Rapoport, Amnon
我们研究了一类多层次的集体行动，其中每个个体同时参与群体内冲突和群体间竞争。群体内冲突被建模为n人囚徒困境博弈，其中的主导策略是什么都不做。组间竞争是为了获得一个由获胜组成员分享的外部和众所周知的奖品。我们专注于两个最常见的分配规则，平等和比例的贡献水平的影响。研究结果表明：（1）在组间竞争中嵌入组内冲突显著减少了搭便车行为;（2）按比例利润分配规则显著优于平均主义规则，并且两者之间的差异随着经验的增加而增加;（3）在平均主义而非按比例分享的情况下，与理论预测相比，存在超额贡献，以及（4）简单的基于认知的学习模型考虑了所有五个实验条件的总结果。(c)2005年爱思唯尔公司All rights reserved.
We study a class of multi-level collective actions, in which each individual is simultaneously engaged in an intragroup conflict and intergroup competition. The intragroup conflict is modeled as an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which the dominant strategy is to contribute nothing. The intergroup competition is for an exogenous and commonly known prize shared by members of the winning group. We focus on the effects on the level of contribution of the two most common sharing rules for dividing the prize, equal and proportional. Our results show that (1) embedding the intragroup conflict in intergroup competition markedly reduces free riding; (2) the proportional profit sharing rule significantly outperforms the egalitarian rule, and the difference between the two increases with experience; (3) under egalitarian but not under proportional sharing, there is over-contribution compared to theoretical predictions, and (4) a simple reinforcement-based learning model accounts for the aggregate results of all five experimental conditions. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.