Tenant Protection, Temporal Vacancy, and Frequent Reconstruction in the Rental Housing Market

Tenant Protection, Temporal Vacancy, and Frequent Reconstruction in the Rental Housing Market
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租赁住房市场租户保护、临时空置、频繁改造

DOI:
10.1111/1540-6229.12205
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发表时间:
2017
影响因子:
2.2
通讯作者:
Masatomo Suzuki and Yasushi Asami
Masatomo Suzuki and Yasushi Asami
中科院分区:
经济学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
SUZUKI Masatomo;HINO Kimihiro;鈴木雅智;鈴木雅智;鈴木雅智;鈴木雅智,浅見泰司;Masatomo Suzuki and Yasushi Asami

文献摘要

相似文献

在日本,租户受到保护,因为业主必须补偿违背他们意愿驱逐他们的行为,而业主无法预测潜在租户的预期租期。如果业主不能明确规定租约的期限,就会出现以下社会效率低下的情况:(1)个人拥有的独立房屋在一段时间内仍处于空置状态;(2)房东新建的公寓没有被驱逐的风险,但却容纳了很大一部分租户;(3)公寓经常重建,尽管它们仍然可以使用。如果有固定期限的合同,只有短期租户才会选择,信息不对称就会消失,实现社会效率。
In Japan, tenants are protected in the sense that owners must compensate them for evicting them against their will, while owners cannot foresee the intended tenure length of prospective tenants. If owners cannot specify the term of a lease, social inefficiency emerges: (i) detached houses owned by individual households remain vacant for a certain period; (ii) alternatively, landlords’ newly constructed apartments, which are free from eviction risk, accommodate a large proportion of tenants; and (iii) the apartments are rebuilt frequently even though they remain viable. If a fixed‐term contract is available, only short‐term tenants choose it, and the information asymmetry is dissolved, realizing social efficiency.