Tenant Protection, Temporal Vacancy, and Frequent Reconstruction in the Rental Housing Market
Tenant Protection, Temporal Vacancy, and Frequent Reconstruction in the Rental Housing Market
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租赁住房市场租户保护、临时空置、频繁改造
DOI:
10.1111/1540-6229.12205
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发表时间:
2017
影响因子:
2.2
通讯作者:
Masatomo Suzuki and Yasushi Asami
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
SUZUKI Masatomo;HINO Kimihiro;鈴木雅智;鈴木雅智;鈴木雅智;鈴木雅智,浅見泰司;Masatomo Suzuki and Yasushi Asami
In Japan, tenants are protected in the sense that owners must compensate them for evicting them against their will, while owners cannot foresee the intended tenure length of prospective tenants. If owners cannot specify the term of a lease, social inefficiency emerges: (i) detached houses owned by individual households remain vacant for a certain period; (ii) alternatively, landlords’ newly constructed apartments, which are free from eviction risk, accommodate a large proportion of tenants; and (iii) the apartments are rebuilt frequently even though they remain viable. If a fixed‐term contract is available, only short‐term tenants choose it, and the information asymmetry is dissolved, realizing social efficiency.