The Marriage Model with Search Frictions

The Marriage Model with Search Frictions
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DOI:
10.1086/510440
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发表时间:
1997-02
影响因子:
8.2
通讯作者:
Lones Smith
Lones Smith
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Lones Smith

文献摘要

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相似文献

考虑一个异类代理匹配模型,其中每个匹配个体的收益是双方类型的固定函数。在1973年的一篇文章中,贝克尔表明,如果每个人都喜欢更高的伴侣,那么在一个没有摩擦的环境中,就会出现分类匹配。这篇论文表明,如果寻找伴侣需要耗时的搜索,而且个人没有耐心,那么富有成效的互动很重要。配对是积极的分类--较高的类型与较高的类型匹配--当拥有更好的伴侣的比例收益在一个类型中上升时。在可乘可分离收益的情况下,这些比例收益在一个人的类型中是恒定的,于是出现了“区块分离”,这是文献中常见的发现。
Consider a heterogeneous agent matching model in which the payoff of each matched individual is a fixed function of both partners’ types. In a 1973 article, Becker showed that assortative matching arises in a frictionless setting simply if everyone prefers higher partners. This paper shows that if finding partners requires time‐consuming search and individuals are impatient, then productive interaction matters. Matching is positively assortative—higher types match with higher sets of types—when the proportionate gains from having better partners rise in one’s type. With multiplicatively separable payoffs, these proportionate gains are constant in one’s type, and “block segregation” arises, a common finding of the literature.