Optimal pricing for a multi-echelon closed loop supply chain with different power structures and product dual differences
Optimal pricing for a multi-echelon closed loop supply chain with different power structures and product dual differences
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不同权力结构和产品双差异的多梯次闭环供应链最优定价
DOI：
10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.120281
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Chang Xiangyun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Liu Wenjie;Qin Dingzhi;Shen Ningning;Zhang Jing;Jin Mingzhou;Xie Naiming;Chen Jian;Chang Xiangyun
本研究的主要目的是探讨不同的权力结构和产品对偶差异对多级闭环供应链定价策略的影响，并提出未来的改进策略。为了实现这些目标，构建了MCLSC的集中式和分散式定价模型，以探索不同权力结构下的最优成员定价和最优利润：集中式、制造商主导的Stackelberg(MS)、零售商主导的Stackelberg(RS)和收集者主导的Stackelberg(CS)定价模型，并分析了三个关键参数(收集率、交叉价格弹性系数和二手产品的质量等级比)对它们的影响。通过综合理论比较和汽车交流发电机的实例分析，理论分析结果表明：(1)集中式定价模型总能使MCLSC的总利润最大，而CS模型的总利润最小；(2)对于三种分散定价模型，新产品和再制造产品的最优批发价和最优零售价都随着收集率和交叉价格弹性系数的增加而增加。而对于MS模型和RS模型，废旧产品的最优收购价格随之降低；(3)在各个分散定价模型中，新产品的最优批发价和最优零售价都随着质量等级比的增加而上升。案例研究还发现：(1)随着收购率的提高，最优总利润呈U型曲线，“收款率附近的利润陷阱”为44.4%；(2)最优收购价格随交叉价格弹性系数略有下降，而最优批发价和最优零售价大幅上升。这导致了MCLSC成员和消费者之间的利益冲突。(3)随着质量等级比的升高，最优成员利润和最优总利润均呈上升趋势，并呈空壳状。当再制造率提高到95%时，它们接近最大值。本文的主要贡献在于为物流供应链的最优定价决策提供有效的决策工具，并为提升物流供应链的绩效提出相应的产业政策和企业战略。
Main objectives of this research are to investigate the effect of different power structures and product dual difference on pricing policies of a multi-echelon closed loop supply chain (MCLSC), and to propose future improvement strategies. To achieve these objectives, centralized and decentralized pricing models for this MCLSC were constructed to explore optimal member pricing and optimal profit under different power structures: centralized, Manufacturer-led Stackelberg (MS), Retailer-led Stackelberg (RS) and Collector-led Stackelberg (CS) pricing models, and to analyze the impact of three key parameters (collection rate, cross-price elasticity coefficient and quality grade ratio of used products) on them. By comprehensive theory comparisons and a case study of auto alternator, the results of theory analysis indicated: (1) Centralized pricing model always achieved maximum total profit of the MCLSC, but CS model obtained a minimum total profit; (2) For three decentralized pricing models, optimal wholesale price and optimal retail price for new product and remanufactured product all increased with collection rate and cross-price elasticity coefficient. But for MS model and RS model, optimal acquisition price for used product decreased with them; (3) Optimal wholesale price and optimal retail price for new product rised up with quality grade ratio in each decentralized pricing model. There are also three important findings for case study: (1) With increase of collection rate, optimal total profit showed a U- shaped curve, with a "Profit Trap around Collection Rate of 44.4 %"; (2) Optimal acquisition price dropped slightly with cross-price elasticity coefficient, however optimal wholesale price and optimal retail price increased sharply. This caused a benefit conflict between MCLSC member and consumers. So it should be controlled under 1.24 unit/Yuan; (3) With rise of quality grade ratio, optimal member profits and optimal total profit all rose up and showed a shell shape. They reached approximate maximum when remanufacturing ratio was raised to 95%. Major contribution of this paper is to offer an effective decision tool for optimal pricing decision of the MCLSC, and to propose appropriate industrial policies and enterprise strategies for promoting the performance of the MCLSC.