IBWH: An Intermittent Block Withholding Attack with Optimal Mining Reward Rate
IBWH: An Intermittent Block Withholding Attack with Optimal Mining Reward Rate
复制标题
IBWH：具有最优挖矿奖励率的间歇性扣块攻击
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Zheng Yang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Junming Ke;Pawel Szalachowski;Jianying Zhou;Qiuliang Xu;Zheng Yang
在工作验证(PoW)区块链系统中，将采矿权聚集到采矿池的趋势引发了对这些系统的稳定性和安全性的严重担忧。这样的池可能会通过战略性地扣留已找到的解决方案(即块)而行为不端。事实证明，偏离诚实挖掘策略可以显著提高大型恶意挖掘池的回报。此外，恶意池可以发起阻止预扣(BWH)攻击，通过允许恶意参与者在假装贡献工作的同时获得不劳而获的份额，从而使目标的池奖励系统不公平。虽然这些攻击是众所周知的，但它们通常是以简化的静态奖励模型进行调查的。
A trend in clustering mining power into mining pools in proof-of-work (PoW) blockchain systems raises severe concerns on the stability and security of these systems. Such pools can misbehave by strategically withhold found solutions (i.e., blocks). It has been shown that the reward of a large malicious mining pool can be significantly increased by deviating from the honest mining strategy. Moreover, a malicious pool can launch the block withholding (BWH) attack making the target’s pool reward system unfair by letting malicious participants receive unearned shares while pretending to contribute work. Although these attacks are well-known, they are usually investigated in a simplified static reward model.