Oligopoly with a large number of competitors: asymmetric limit result
Oligopoly with a large number of competitors: asymmetric limit result
复制标题
寡头垄断与大量竞争者：非对称极限结果
DOI：
10.1007/s00199-008-0353-9
复制
发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Tomohiko Kawamori
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hiroaki Ino;Tomohiko Kawamori
我们通过研究不对称寡头垄断模型来解决创新在竞争市场中的盈利性问题，在该模型中，一家公司（创新者）的成本优势不足以使其成为垄断者，并通过诱导其他公司（落后公司）的数量趋于无穷大时的不对称极限结果。如果创新者是Stackelberg领导者，则可能出现两种情况：(i)创新者的行为与竞争市场一样，或（ii）她占据了整个市场，但无法定价。如果我们考虑古诺竞争，创新者就变成了部分垄断者。
We address how profitable innovation is in a competitive market by investigating the asymmetric oligopoly model in which 1 firm (innovator) has a cost advantage that is not drastic enough for her to become a monopolist, and by inducing asymmetric limit outcomes when the number of the other firms (laggard firms) goes to infinity. If the innovator is the Stackelberg leader, two cases can arise: (i) the innovator behaves as in the competitive market or (ii) she occupies the entire market but cannot make the price. If we consider Cournot competition, the innovator becomes the partial monopolist.