Avoiding The Man on the Wire: Improving Tor's Security with Trust-Aware Path Selection
Avoiding The Man on the Wire: Improving Tor's Security with Trust-Aware Path Selection
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避免网络上的人：通过信任感知路径选择提高 Tor 的安全性
DOI：
10.14722/ndss.2017.23307
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Syverson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Aaron Johnson;Rob Jansen;A. D. Jaggard;J. Feigenbaum;P. Syverson
Tor 用户很容易受到可以观察某些 Tor 中继或网络某些部分的对手的去匿名化。我们证明了之前提出解决此问题的网络感知路径选择算法很容易受到跨多个 Tor 连接的攻击。我们建议用户使用信任来选择不太可能被观察到的通过 Tor 的路径，其中信任被灵活地建模为用户对手位置的概率分布，并且我们提出了 Tor 的信任感知路径选择算法，可以帮助用户避免流量分析攻击，同时仍然选择许多其他用户可能选择的路径。我们使用高级互联网路由图在两种设置中评估该算法：(i) 用户尝试避免单个全球对手，该对手有独立的机会控制每个自治系统组织、互联网交换点组织和 Tor 中继系列，以及 (ii) 用户尝试避免任何单个国家的去匿名化。我们还使用 Shadow 网络模拟器检查信任感知路径选择的性能。
Tor users are vulnerable to deanonymization by an adversary that can observe some Tor relays or some parts of the network. We demonstrate that previous network-aware path-selection algorithms that propose to solve this problem are vulnerable to attacks across multiple Tor connections. We suggest that users use trust to choose the paths through Tor that are less likely to be observed, where trust is flexibly modeled as a probability distribution on the location of the user's adversaries, and we present the Trust-Aware Path Selection algorithm for Tor that helps users avoid traffic-analysis attacks while still choosing paths that could have been selected by many other users. We evaluate this algorithm in two settings using a high-level map of Internet routing: (i) users try to avoid a single global adversary that has an independent chance to control each Autonomous System organization, Internet Exchange Point organization, and Tor relay family, and (ii) users try to avoid deanonymization by any single country. We also examine the performance of Trust-Aware Path selection using the Shadow network simulator.
DeNASA：匿名通信中的目的地朴素 AS 意识
影响因子：
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作者：
Barton, Armon;Wright, Matthew
通讯作者：
Wright, Matthew