Natural sample spaces and uncertain belief.
Natural sample spaces and uncertain belief.
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自然样本空间和不确定信念。
DOI：
--
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发表时间：
1992
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
Chun Hui
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Igor Gavanski;Chun Hui
本文提出了一个新的框架来理解概率的判断。准确和不准确的判断都是根据它们所基于的信息集或样本空间来概念化的。当从存储器容易地访问适当的样本空间时（例如，当它们与自然认知范畴相对应时，人们会做出相对准确的判断，否则，人们可能会替换更容易接近但不合适的样本空间，从而导致判断错误。在3个实验中，样本空间框架被用来解释基本比率谬误。结果表明：（a）人们自发地访问与自然类别相对应的样本空间，（B）依赖于不适当的样本空间产生基本率谬误，（c）突出适当的样本空间提高了人们对基本率判断的敏感性。讨论扩展了框架，以解释其他判断域的准确性和错误。
This article proposes a novel framework for understanding judgments of probability. Both accurate and inaccurate judgments are conceptualized in terms of the sets of information, or sample spaces, on which they are based. When appropriate sample spaces are easily accessed from memory (e.g., when they correspond to natural cognitive categories), people will make relatively accurate judgments; otherwise, people may substitute more accessible but inappropriate sample spaces and make judgment errors. In 3 experiments, the sample space framework was applied to account for the base rate fallacy. Results showed that (a) people spontaneously access sample spaces that correspond to natural categories, (b) reliance on inappropriate sample spaces produces the base rate fallacy, and (c) highlighting appropriate sample spaces improves the sensitivity of people's judgments to base rates. Discussion extends the framework to explain accuracy and error in other judgment domains.
DOI：
10.1037//0096-3445.117.1.68
发表时间：
1988-03
期刊：
Journal of experimental psychology. General
影响因子：
--
作者：
Douglas L. Medin;S. Edelson
通讯作者：
Douglas L. Medin;S. Edelson