Imperfect durability and the Coase conjecture
Imperfect durability and the Coase conjecture
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不完全耐久性与科斯猜想
DOI：
10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00001.x
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Meng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Deneckere;Meng
本文考虑的是一个由垄断者服务的市场，该垄断者销售的耐用商品会随着时间的推移随机贬值。我们证明了存在三种类型的平稳均衡：科斯猜想均衡、垄断均衡和声誉均衡。当折旧率较低时，科斯猜想均衡是唯一均衡。对于折旧率的中间值，所有三种均衡类型都是共存的。当折旧率较高时，垄断均衡是唯一均衡。因此，当销售耐用性足够低的商品时，垄断者不会失去任何垄断力量。此外，声誉均衡中的稳态产出低于垄断数量。因此，在耐用品市场中，垄断力量造成的福利损失可能比易腐品市场中的要大。版权所有(C)2008，兰德。
This article considers a market served by a monopolist who sells a durable good that depreciates stochastically over time. We show that there exist three types of stationary equilibria: a Coase Conjecture equilibrium, a monopoly equilibrium, and a reputational equilibrium. When the depreciation rate is low, the Coase Conjecture equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. For intermediate values of the depreciation rate, all three equilibrium types coexist. When the depreciation rate is high, the monopoly equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. Consequently, when selling a good of sufficiently low durability, the monopolist does not lose any of her monopoly power. Furthermore, the steady-state output in the reputational equilibrium falls below the monopoly quantity. Hence, in durable goods markets, welfare losses due to monopoly power may be larger than in markets for perishables. Copyright (c)2008, RAND.