The Democratic Coup d'État
The Democratic Coup d'État
复制标题
民主政变
DOI：
10.1093/oso/9780190626013.001.0001
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ozan O. Varol
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ozan O. Varol
这篇文章探讨了一个在很大程度上被忽视的现象，我称之为“民主政变”的典型特征和宪法后果。迄今为止，学术界的法律的文献都是在反民主的框架下分析所有军事政变的。这一传统框架认为军事政变完全是反民主的，并假定所有政变都是由渴望权力的军官实施的，他们寻求推翻现有政权，以便无限期地统治他们的国家。因此，在主流观点看来，所有军事政变都是对稳定、合法性和民主的冒犯。本文借鉴了我2011年在埃及和土耳其进行的实地调查，挑战了传统观点及其基本假设。文章认为，尽管所有的军事政变都有反民主的特征，但有些政变明显比其他政变更有利于民主，因为它们响应了民众对独裁或极权政权的反对，推翻了这些政权，并促进了自由和公正的选举。民主政变后，军方作为临时政府的一部分暂时统治国家，直到民主选举举行。在整个民主过渡过程中，军方表现得像一个自利的行为者，并将其政策偏好巩固或试图巩固到过渡期间起草的新宪法中。宪法的巩固可能以三种方式发生：程序性、实质性和体制性。本文使用三个比较案例来说明民主政变现象和宪法巩固理论：（1）1960年土耳其军事政变;（2）1974年葡萄牙军事政变;（3）2011年埃及军事政变。
This article examines the typical characteristics and constitutional consequences of a largely neglected phenomenon that I call the “democratic coup d’etat.” To date, the academic legal literature has analyzed all military coups under an anti-democratic framework. That conventional framework considers military coups to be entirely anti-democratic and assumes that all coups are perpetrated by power-hungry military officers seeking to depose existing regimes in order to rule their nations indefinitely. Under the prevailing view, therefore, all military coups constitute an affront to stability, legitimacy, and democracy. This article, which draws on fieldwork that I conducted in Egypt and Turkey in 2011, challenges that conventional view and its underlying assumptions. The article argues that, although all military coups have anti-democratic features, some coups are distinctly more democracy-promoting than others because they respond to popular opposition against authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, overthrow those regimes, and facilitate free and fair elections. Following a democratic coup, the military temporarily governs the nation as part of an interim government until democratic elections take place. Throughout the democratic-transition process, the military behaves as a self-interested actor and entrenches, or attempts to entrench, its policy preferences into the new constitution drafted during the transition. Constitutional entrenchment may occur in three ways: procedural, substantive, and institutional. The article uses three comparative case studies to illustrate the democratic-coup phenomenon and the constitutional-entrenchment thesis: (1) the 1960 military coup in Turkey; (2) the 1974 military coup in Portugal; and (3) the 2011 military coup in Egypt.