Globalization, Philanthropy, and Civil Society: Projecting Institutional Logics Abroad
Globalization, Philanthropy, and Civil Society: Projecting Institutional Logics Abroad
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全球化、慈善事业和公民社会：在国外投射制度逻辑
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发表时间：
2010
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Briefly Noted
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Briefly Noted
苏珊·巴克-莫斯是一位思想史学家和政治理论家，她早期关于西奥多·阿多诺（Theodor Adorno，1977）和沃尔特·本雅明（Walter Benjamin，1989）的著作并没有合理地预示她2000年的著名文章《黑格尔与海地》（《批判性研究》，第26卷）。正如她在这本新书中所说的那样（这本书将前一篇文章与最近一篇文章结合起来），“我并没有打算写黑格尔或海地”（第3页），但她被这条道路所吸引，试图分析“经济”的历史意义，从亚当·斯密开始，以及1776年迎接他的《国富论》的“巨大兴奋”。她认为黑格尔的早期著作可能会提供线索，并从那里她最终觉得有必要提出一个新的问题：当黑格尔在1806年写的“主与奴隶”的关系在精神现象学（第四节，A，3），这如此影响了马克思和其他人，为什么他没有提到正在进行的海地奴隶起义作为一个恰当的历史例子？黑格尔热衷于阅读报纸，所以他几乎肯定知道这件事，这本身在今天看来可能是一个微不足道或无关紧要的问题，不仅对社会学家，而且对哲学家来说，但巴克-莫尔斯为她的回答注入了活力。她声称，黑格尔开创了一种忽视海地起义的传统，这是有记录以来唯一成功的奴隶起义，原因是种族主义，欧洲中心主义，以及我们现在最后应该纠正的思想和想象力的其他缺陷。她的语气是一种恼怒的语气，例如，“黑格尔实际上变得更笨了”（第83页）。指责黑格尔愚蠢是荒谬的--就像说莫扎特是音调错误--然而她的修辞策略几乎奏效了。她还建议我们“原谅"西蒙·沙马在他的荷兰研究中忽视了黑人奴隶的作用（第25页），”原谅“卢梭的沉默，因为他在理论化”社会契约“时忽略了提到《黑色法典》（1685）（第33页），并想知道”原谅卢梭的种族主义“（第34页），即使有时代错误的风险。她占据了道德制高点，并敦促其他政治理论家加入她，因为她强调了我们最著名的前辈的缺点，因为通过我们新鲜地面的道德透镜。她的努力是生动的，值得阅读，特别是315个脚注，其中她使她的情况很大。
Susan Buck-Morss is an intellectual historian and political theorist whose earlier books on Theodor Adorno (1977) and Walter Benjamin (1989) would not reasonably have presaged her now famous essay from 2000, ‘‘Hegel and Haiti’’ (in Critical Inquiry, vol. 26). As she says in this new book (which pairs the earlier essay with a more recent one), ‘‘I did not set out to write about Hegel or Haiti’’ (p. 3), but she was drawn to this path in trying to analyze the historical meaning of ‘‘the economy,’’ beginning with Adam Smith, and the ‘‘enormous excitement’’ that greeted his Wealth of Nations in 1776. She thought Hegel’s early works might lend a clue, and from there she eventually felt the need to pose a novel question: When Hegel in 1806 wrote about the ‘‘lord and bondsman’’ relationship in The Phenomenology of Spirit (Section IV, A, 3), which so influenced Marx and others, why did he not refer to the ongoing Haitian slave revolt as an apt historical example? Hegel read newspapers avidly, so he almost surely knew about it. In itself, this might seem a trivial or irrelevant concern today, not only for sociologists but also for philosophers, yet Buck-Morss breathes life into her answer. She claims that Hegel initiated a tradition of ignoring the Haitian revolt—the only successful slave revolt on record—for reasons of racism, Euro-centrism, and other deficiencies of mind and imagination which we, now, finally, ought to make right. Her tone is one of exasperated anger, e.g., ‘‘Hegel was in fact becoming dumber’’ (p. 83). It is absurd to accuse Hegel of stupidity—like saying Mozart was tone deaf—yet her rhetorical ploy almost works. She also suggests that we ‘‘excuse’’ Simon Schama for neglecting the role of black slaves in his study of Holland (p. 25), ‘‘excuse the silence’’ of Rousseau for having neglected mentioning Le Code Noir (1685) when theorizing the ‘‘social contract’’ (p. 33), and wonders about ‘‘excusing Roussseau’s racism’’ (p. 34), even at the risk of anachronism. She has occupied the moral highground, and urges other political theorists to join her as she highlights the shortcomings of our most notable predecessors as viewed through our freshly ground moral lens. Her effort is lively and worth reading, especially the 315 footnotes wherein she makes much of her case.