Hide and Seek: A Defense Against Off-sensing Attack in Cognitive Radio Networks
Hide and Seek: A Defense Against Off-sensing Attack in Cognitive Radio Networks
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DOI：
10.1109/infocom.2019.8737471
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发表时间：
2019-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Moinul Hossain;Jiang Xie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Moinul Hossain;Jiang Xie
在基于认知无线电的网络 (CRN) 中，次要用户会机会性地访问未充分利用的频谱资源，并在获得许可或主要用户重新出现时停止使用这些资源。最近，一种新的攻击，off-sensing (OS)，揭示了 CRN 的 FCC 政策中的漏洞。操作系统攻击利用受害者的感知间隔来实施攻击并操纵受害者的频谱可用性。然而，先前关于操作系统攻击的工作考虑了一种不切实际的确定性方法，并且对于强化传统防御技术是徒劳的。在本文中，我们提出了一种新的随机方法，即随机操作系统攻击，它适应现实场景，并且使用传统技术很难检测到。然后，我们提出了一种基于马尔可夫决策过程的新颖的防护方法来防御所提出的攻击，即隐藏和寻找。我们还引入了操作系统攻击检测策略，该策略利用感知历史记录来检测攻击者的存在，而不会违反任何策略或设计限制，也没有任何网络开销。数学分析和广泛的模拟结果展示了我们提出的工作的优越性能，并在不修改当前 FCC 政策的情况下为设计保障策略提供了方向。
In a cognitive radio-based network (CRN), secondary users opportunistically access underutilized spectrum resources and stop utilizing these resources when licensed or primary users reappear. Recently, a new attack, off-sensing (OS), has shed light on a vulnerability in the FCC policy of CRN. OS-attack utilizes the off-sensing interval of a victim to perpetrate the attack and to manipulate the victim’s spectrum availability. However, prior work on OS-attack considers a deterministic approach that is unrealistic and is futile to fortify against conventional defense techniques. In this paper, we propose a new random approach, the random-OS attack, which adapts to realistic scenarios and is difficult to detect using conventional techniques. Then, we propose a novel safeguard approach based on the Markov decision process to defend the proposed attack, namely hide and seek. We also introduce an OS-attack detection strategy, which utilizes the sensing history to detect the presence of attackers without violating any policy or design constraints and without any networking overhead. Mathematical analysis and extensive simulation results exhibit the superior performance of our proposed works and advent a direction in designing safeguard strategies without amending the current FCC policies.