Detecting the Collapse of Cooperation in Evolving Networks.
Detecting the Collapse of Cooperation in Evolving Networks.
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DOI：
10.1038/srep30845
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发表时间：
2016-08-05
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Dakos V
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cavaliere M;Yang G;Danos V;Dakos V
生物、社会、经济和生态社区的可持续性往往取决于合作和自私的个人（骗子）之间的社会冲突的结果。作弊者避免了为社区做贡献的成本，偶尔会在人群中传播，导致合作的完全崩溃。虽然这种崩溃往往出乎意料地展开，但目前还不清楚是否可以检测出骗子入侵和在不断发展的社区中失去合作的风险。在这里，我们结合联合收割机动态网络和进化博弈论，研究突然失去合作的工具，研究关键转变。我们估计的风险，合作崩溃后，在逐渐变化的条件下引入一个单一的骗子。我们观察到，随着崩溃风险的增加，作弊者从社区中被淘汰所需的平均时间也在增加。我们认为，这种缓慢的系统响应类似于一个关键的过渡之前，在恢复率放缓。此外，我们展示了社区结构的变化如何反映合作崩溃的风险。我们发现，这些变化在很大程度上取决于作弊者在社区中进化的机制。我们的研究结果突出了在不断发展的网络中检测突变的新方向。
The sustainability of biological, social, economic and ecological communities is often determined by the outcome of social conflicts between cooperative and selfish individuals (cheaters). Cheaters avoid the cost of contributing to the community and can occasionally spread in the population leading to the complete collapse of cooperation. Although such collapse often unfolds unexpectedly, it is unclear whether one can detect the risk of cheater’s invasions and loss of cooperation in an evolving community. Here, we combine dynamical networks and evolutionary game theory to study the abrupt loss of cooperation with tools for studying critical transitions. We estimate the risk of cooperation collapse following the introduction of a single cheater under gradually changing conditions. We observe an increase in the average time it takes for cheaters to be eliminated from the community as the risk of collapse increases. We argue that such slow system response resembles slowing down in recovery rates prior to a critical transition. In addition, we show how changes in community structure reflect the risk of cooperation collapse. We find that these changes strongly depend on the mechanism that governs how cheaters evolve in the community. Our results highlight novel directions for detecting abrupt transitions in evolving networks.