A framework for evaluation of supply chain coordination by contracts under O2O environment

A framework for evaluation of supply chain coordination by contracts under O2O environment
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DOI:
10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.08.004
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发表时间:
2019-09
影响因子:
12
通讯作者:
K. Govindan;Andreea Malomfalean
K. Govindan;Andreea Malomfalean
中科院分区:
工程技术1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
K. Govindan;Andreea Malomfalean

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在过去的十年中,企业发展的方式发生了重大变化,而这种变化很大程度上是由于技术的快速变化。整个世界都依赖于在线网络,它从根本上改变了我们对业务管理方式的看法。企业适应得越快,就能越快地超越竞争对手,而一种备受关注的新方式被称为线上到线下(O2O)。本文建立了基于O2O方式的比较;我们的模型考虑了三种协调机制(收入分享、回购和数量灵活合同)下的两种需求。我们证明,在数量灵活性协议下,O2O 确定性需求可以实现最佳结果和最高利润。然而,随机需求情况得到了相同的结果。本文对这一新兴主题进行了富有成效的介绍,未来的研究可能会使用 Stackelberg 博弈论来比较几种协调机制。
Over the past decade, a significant change has occurred in the way businesses progress, and that change is largely due to rapidly changing technology. The entire world depends on the online network that has radically changed our perspective of how business should be managed. The faster a company adapts, the more quickly that company can outpace its competitors, and a new approach that is attracting attention is called Online to Offline (O2O).This paper establishes a comparison based on O2O approach; our model considers two types of demand under three coordination mechanisms (revenue-sharing, buy-back, and quantity flexibility contracts). We demonstrate that the best outcome and the highest profit is achieved with the O2O deterministic demand under the quantity flexibility agreement. However, the stochastic demand case attains the same result. This paper presents a fruitful introduction to this emerging topic, and future research might compare several coordination mechanisms using the Stackelberg game theory.