Evolution of Cooperation in Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma Games on Barabasi—Albert Networks with Degree-Dependent Guilt Mechanism
Evolution of Cooperation in Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma Games on Barabasi—Albert Networks with Degree-Dependent Guilt Mechanism
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DOI：
10.1088/0253-6102/57/5/22
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发表时间：
2012-05
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Xianjia Wang;Ji Quan;Wei-bing Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Xianjia Wang;Ji Quan;Wei-bing Liu
研究了Barabasi-Albert（BA）网络上的连续囚徒困境博弈（CPDG）。在该模型中，网络顶点上的每个代理都进行投资，并与所有相邻代理进行交互。进行投资是昂贵的，但这有利于其邻近的代理人，其中利益和成本取决于投资水平。每个代理人的收益是由它在与所有邻居的交互中获得的收益之和给出的。不仅考虑了收益，还考虑了博弈中个体的内疚情绪。与邻居比较时产生的负性内疚情绪会直接降低个体的效用。我们假设减少量取决于个人的程度和基线水平参数。该群体的合作水平的特点是人口的平均投资。每个参与者在下一步的投资是基于他的最佳邻居在上一步的投资，他的最佳历史策略在最近的步骤中的数量由记忆长度参数控制，和均匀分布的随机数的凸组合。仿真结果表明，与度无关的有罪或无罪情况相比，度相关的有罪机制能显著促进合作的演化。模仿、记忆、不确定性系数和网络结构也对群体的合作水平起决定性作用。这些结果对于研究基于网络互惠机制的合作演化具有一定的参考价值。
This paper studies the continuous prisoner's dilemma games (CPDG) on Barabasi—Albert (BA) networks. In the model, each agent on a vertex of the networks makes an investment and interacts with all of his neighboring agents. Making an investment is costly, but which benefits its neighboring agents, where benefit and cost depend on the level of investment made. The payoff of each agent is given by the sum of payoffs it receives in its interactions with all its neighbors. Not only payoff, individual's guilty emotion in the games has also been considered. The negative guilty emotion produced in comparing with its neighbors can reduce the utility of individuals directly. We assume that the reduction amount depends on the individual's degree and a baseline level parameter. The group's cooperative level is characterized by the average investment of the population. Each player makes his investment in the next step based on a convex combination of the investment of his best neighbors in the last step, his best history strategies in the latest steps which number is controlled by a memory length parameter, and a uniformly distributed random number. Simulation results show that this degree-dependent guilt mechanism can promote the evolution of cooperation dramatically comparing with degree-independent guilt or no guilt cases. Imitation, memory, uncertainty coefficients and network structure also play determinant roles in the cooperation level of the population. All our results may shed some new light on studying the evolution of cooperation based on network reciprocity mechanisms.